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| *Chapter 1* |
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**Law and Legal Reasoning**

**Introduction**

The first chapters in Unit 1 provide the background for the entire course. Chapter 1 sets the stage. At this point, it is important to establish goals and objectives. For your students to benefit from this course, they must understand that (1) the law is a set of general rules, (2) that, in applying these general rules, a judge cannot always fit a case to suit a rule, so must fit (or find) a rule to suit the case, (3) that, in fitting (or find­ing) a rule, a judge must also supply reasons for the decision.

The tension in the law between the need for stability, predictability, and continuity, and the need for change is one of the major concepts introduced in this chapter. The answer to the question, “What is the law?,” includes how jurists have an­swered it, how common law courts originated, and the rationale for the doctrine of *stare decisis*.

Another major concept in the chapter involves the distinctions among today’s sources of law and a dis­tinction in its different classifications. The sources include the federal constitution and federal laws, state con­stitutions and statutes (including the UCC), local ordinances, administrative agency regulations, and case law. The classification is the distinction between civil and criminal law. These sources and categories give students a framework on which to hang the mass of principles known as the law.

**Chapter Outline**

**I. Business Activities and the Legal Environment**

**A. Many Different Laws May Affect a Single Business Decision**

Panels of experts and scholars create uniform laws that any state’s legislature can adopt.

**1. Lessons from Facebook**

The text presents and illustrates an example of how various areas of the law can affect different aspects of a business (Facebook).

**2. Points to Consider**

A businessperson should know enough about the law to know when to ask for advice.

**B. Ethics and Business Decision Making**

Ethics can influence business decisions.

**II. Sources of American Law**

**A. Constitutional Law**

The federal constitution is a general document that distributes power among the branches of the government. It is the supreme law of the land. Any law that conflicts with it is invalid. The states also have constitutions, but the federal constitution prevails if their provisions conflict.

**B. Statutory Law**

Statutes and ordinances are enacted by Congress, state legislatures, and local legislative bodies. Much of the work of courts is interpreting what lawmakers meant when a law was passed and apply­ing that law to a set of facts (a case).

**1. Uniform Laws**

Panels of experts and scholars create uniform laws that any state’s legislature can adopt.

**2. The Uniform Commercial Code**

The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides a uniform flexible set of rules that govern most commercial transactions. The UCC has been adopted by all the states (only in part in Louisiana), the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands.

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| **Additional Background—** |
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| **National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,**  **Co-sponsor of the Uniform Commercial Code** |
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| As explained in the text, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is an ambitious codification of commercial common law principles. The UCC has been the most widely adopted, and thus the most successful, of the many uniform and model acts that have been drafted. The **National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws** is responsible for many of these acts. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is an organization of state commissioners ap­pointed by the governor of each state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Their goal is to pro­mote uniformity in state law where uniformity is desirable. The purpose is to alleviate problems that arise in an increasingly interdependent society in which a single transaction may cross many states. Financial support comes from state grants. The members meet annually to consider drafts of pro­posed legislation. The American Law Institute works with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on some of the uniform state laws. |
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**C. Administrative Law**

Administrative law consists of the rules, orders, and decisions of administrative agencies.

**1. Federal Agencies**

Executive agencies within the cabinet departments of the executive branch are subject to the power of the president to appoint and remove their officers. The officers of independent agencies serve fixed terms and cannot be removed without just cause.

**2. State and Local Agencies**

These agencies are often parallel federal agencies in areas of expertise and subjects of regulation. Federal rules that conflict with state rules take precedence.

**D. Case Law and Common Law Doctrines**

Another basic source of American law consists of the rules of law announced in court decisions. These rules include judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions, of statutes enacted by legislatures, and of regulations created by administrative agencies.

**III. The Common Law Tradition**

American law is based on the English common law legal system. Knowledge of this tradition is necessary to students’ understanding of the nature of our legal system.

**A. Early English Courts**

The English system unified its local courts in 1066. This unified system, based on the decisions judges make in cases, is the common law sys­tem.

**1. Courts of Law and Remedies at Law**

A court of law is limited to awarding payments of money or property as compensation.

**2. Courts of Equity**

Equity is a branch of unwritten law, which was founded in justice and fair dealing, and seeks to supply a fairer and more adequate remedy than a remedy at law.

**3. Remedies in Equity**

A court of equity can order specific performance, an injunction, or rescission of a contract (Chapter 19).

**4. Equitable Maxims**

These guide the application of equitable remedies.

**B. Legal and Equitable Remedies Today**

Today, in most states, a plaintiff may request both legal and equitable remedies in the same action, and the trial court judge may grant either form—or both forms—of relief.

**C. The Doctrine of *Stare Decisis***

**1. Case Precedents and Case Reporters**

The common law sys­tem involves the applica­tion, in current cases, of principles applied in earlier cases with similar facts.

**2. *Stare Decisis* and the Common Law Tradition**

The use of precedent forms the basis for the doctrine of *stare decisis*.

**3. Controlling Precedents**

A court’s application of a specific principle to a certain set of facts is binding on that court and lower courts, which must then apply it in future cases. A controlling precedent is binding authority. Other binding authorities include constitutions, statutes, and rules.

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| Enhancing Your Lecture— |
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|  Is an 1875 Case Precedent Still Binding?  |
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| In a suit against the U.S. government for breach of contract, Boris Korczak sought compensation for services that he had allegedly performed for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1973 to 1980. Korczak claimed that the government had failed to pay him an annuity and other compensation required by a secret *oral* agreement he had made with the CIA. The federal trial court dismissed Korczak’s claim, and Korczak appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. |
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| At issue on appeal was whether a Supreme Court case decided in 1875, *Totten v. United States****,*a** remained the controlling precedent in this area. In *Totten,* the plaintiff alleged that he had formed a secret contract with President Lincoln to collect information on the Confederate army during the Civil War. When the plaintiff sued the government for compensation for his services, the Supreme Court held that the agreement was unenforceable. According to the Court, to enforce such agreements could result in the disclosure of information that “might compromise or embarrass our government” or cause other “serious detriment” to the public. In Korczak’s case, the federal appellate court held that the *Totten* case precedent was still “good law,” and therefore Korczak, like the plaintiff in *Totten,* could not recover compensation for his services. Said the court, “*Totten,* despite its age, is the last pronouncement on this issue by the Supreme Court. .  .  . We are duty bound to follow the law given us by the Supreme Court unless and until it is changed.”**b** |
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| The Bottom Line |
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| Supreme Court precedents, no matter how old, remain controlling until they are overruled by a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court, by a constitutional amendment, or by congressional legislation. |
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| a. 92 U.S. 105 (1875). |
| b. *Korczak v. United States,* 124 F.3d 227 (Fed.Cir. 1997). |
|  |

**4. *Stare Decisis* and Legal Stability**

This doctrine permits a predictable, quick, and fair resolution of cases, which makes the application of law more stable.

**5. Departures from Precedent**

A judge may decide that a precedent is incorrect, however, if there may have been changes in technology, for exam­ple, business practices, or soci­ety’s at­titudes.

**6. When There Is No Precedent**

When determining which rules and policies to apply in a given case, and in applying them, a judge may examine: prior case law, the principles and policies behind the decisions, and their historical set­ting; statutes and the policies behind a legislature’s passing a specific statute; society’s values and custom; and data and principles from other disciplines.

**D. *Stare Decisis* and Legal Reasoning**

**1. Basic Steps in Legal Reasoning**

Legal reasoning is briefly defined, and the “issue-rule-apply-conclude” format is outlined.

**E. There Is No One “Right” Answer**

Of course, there is no one “right” answer to every legal question.

**F. The Common Law Today**

**1. Courts Interpret Statutes**

Through the courts, the common law governs all areas *not* covered by statutory or administrative law, as well as interpretations of the application of statutes and rules.

**2. *Restatements of the Law* Clarify and Illustrate the Common Law**

The common law principles are summarized in the American Law Institute’s *Restatements of the Law*, which do not have the force of law but are an important secondary source on which judges often rely.

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| **Additional Background—** |
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| Restatement (Second) of Contracts |
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| The American Law Institute (ALI), a group of American legal scholars, is responsible for the *Restatements*. These scholars also work with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on some of the uniform state laws. Members include law ed­ucators, judges, and attor­neys. Their goal is to promote uniformity in state law to encourage the fair administration of jus­tice. |
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| The ALI publishes summaries of common law rules on selected topics. Intended to clarify the rules, the summaries are published as the *Restatements*. Each *Restatement* is further divided into chapters and sections. Accompanying the sections are explanatory comments, ex­amples illustrating the principles, relevant case citations, and other materials. The following is ***Restatement (Second) of Contracts***, Section 1 (that is, Section 1 of the second edition of the *Restatement of Contracts*) with excerpts from the Introductory Note to Chapter 1 and Comments ac­companying the section. |
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| **Chapter 1** |
| **MEANING OF TERMS** |
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| Introductory Note: A persistent source of difficulty in the law of contracts is the fact that words often have different meanings to the speaker and to the hearer. Most words are commonly used in more than one sense, and the words used in this *Restatement* are no exception. It is arguable that the diffi­culty is increased rather than diminished by an attempt to give a word a single definition and to use it only as defined. But where usage varies widely, definition makes it possible to avoid circum­locu­tion in the statement of rules and to hold ambiguity to a minimum. |
|  |
| In the *Restatement*, an effort has been made to use only words with connotations familiar to the le­gal profession, and not to use two or more words to express the same legal concept. Where a word fre­quently used has a variety of distinct meanings, one meaning has been selected and indicated by def­inition. But it is obviously impossible to capture in a definition an entire complex institution such as “contract” or “promise.” The operative facts necessary or sufficient to create legal relations and the legal relations created by those facts will appear with greater fullness in the succeeding chapters. |
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| **§ 1. Contract Defined** |
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| A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the per­formance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty. |
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| **Comment:** |
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| \*  \*  \*  \* |
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| **c. Set of promises.** A contract may consist of a single promise by one person to another, or of mu­tual promises by two persons to one another; or there may be, indeed, any number of persons or any num­ber of promises. One person may make several promises to one person or to several persons, or sev­eral per­sons may join in making promises to one or more persons. To constitute a “set,” promises need not be made simultaneously; it is enough that several promises are regarded by the parties as constituting a single contract, or are so related in subject matter and performance that they may be considered and en­forced together by a court. |
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**IV. Schools of Legal Thought**

**A. The Natural Law School**

Adherents of the *natural law* school believe that govern­ment and the legal system should reflect universal moral and ethical principles that are inher­ent in the na­ture of human life.

**B. The Positivist School**

Followers of the *legal positivism* believe that there can be no higher law than a nation’s positive law (the law created by a particular society at a particular point in time).

**C. The Historical School**

Those of the *historical school* emphasize legal principles that were applied in the past.

**D. Legal Realism**

*Legal realists* believe that judges are influ­enced by their unique individual beliefs and attitudes, that the application of precedent should be tempered by each case’s specific circum­stances, and that extra-legal sources should be considered in making decisions. This influenced the sociological school of jurisprudence, which views law as a tool to promote social justice.

**V. Classifications of Law**

*Substantive law* defines, describes, regulates, and cre­ates rights and du­ties. *Procedural law* includes rules for enforcing those rights. Other classifications include splitting law into federal and state divisions or private and public categories. One of the broadest classification systems divides law into national law and international law.

**A. Civil Law and Criminal Law**

*Civil law* regulates relation­ships between persons and between persons and their governments, and the relief available when their rights are violated. *Criminal law* regulates relationships between individuals and society, and prescribes punishment for proscribed acts.

**B. Cyberlaw**

Cyberlaw is an informal term that describes the body of case and statutory law dealing specifically with issues raised in the context of the Internet.

**VI. How to Find Primary Sources of Law**

A brief introduction to case reporting systems and legal citations is included in the text. Also discussed are pub­li­cations collecting statutes and administrative regulations.

**A. Finding Statutory and Administrative Law**

Publications collecting statutes and administrative regulations are discussed in the text.

**B. Finding Case Law**

A brief introduction to case reporting systems and legal citations is also included.

**VII. How to Read and Understand Case Law**

To assist students in reading and analyzing the court opinions digested in the text, the format is dissected, terms are defined, and a sample case is annotated.

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| **Additional Background—** |
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| **West’s *Federal Reporter*** |
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| West Publishing Company publishes federal court decisions unofficially in a variety of publications. West organizes these reports by court level and issues them chronologically. Opinions from the United States Court of Appeals, for example, are reported in **West’s *Federal Reporter***. West pub­lishes these decisions with headnotes condensing important legal points in the cases. The head­notes are assigned key numbers that cross-reference the points to similar points in cases re­ported in other West publications. The following are excerpts from *Ferguson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, as pub­lished with headnotes in West’s *Federal Reporter*. |
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| **Betty Ann FERGUSON, Petitioner-Appellant,** |
| **v.** |
| **COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.** |
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| **No. 90-4430** |
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| Summary Calendar. |
| United States Court of Appeals, |
| Fifth Circuit. |
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| Jan. 22, 1991. |
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| Taxpayer filed petition. The United States Tax Court, Korner, J., dismissed for lack of prosecu­tion, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals held that court abused its discretion in refusing testi­mony of taxpayer, who refused, on religious grounds, to swear or affirm. |
|  |
| Reversed and remanded. |
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| **1. Constitutional Law 92K84(2)** |
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| Protection of free exercise clause extends to all sincere religious beliefs; courts may not evaluate re­li­gious truth. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1. *Ferguson v. C.I.R.* 921 F.2d 588, 67 A.F.T.R.2d 91-459, 91-1 USTC P 50,052 |
|  |
| **2. Witnesses 410K227** |
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| Court abused its discretion in refusing testimony of witness who refused, on religious grounds, to swear or affirm, and who instead offered to testify accurately and completely and to be subject to penal­ties for perjury. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1; Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 603, 28 U.S.C.A. *Ferguson v. C.I.R.* 921 F.2d 588, 67 A.F.T.R.2d 91-459, 91-1 USTC P 50,052 |
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| Betty Ann Ferguson, Metairie, La., pro se. |
|  |
| Peter K. Scott, Acting Chief Counsel, I.R.S., Gary R. Allen, David I. Pincus, William S. Rose, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Tax Div., Washington, D.C., for respondent-appellee. |
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| Appeal from a Decision of the United States Tax Court. |
| Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and JONES, Circuit Judges. |
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| ***PER CURIAM:*** |
| Betty Ann Ferguson appeals the Tax Court’s dismissal of her petition for lack of prosecution after she refused to swear or affirm at a hearing. We find the Tax Court’s failure to accommodate her ob­jections inconsistent with both Fed.R.Evid. 603 and the First Amendment and reverse. |
| I. |
| This First Amendment case ironically arose out of a hearing in Tax Court. Although the govern­ment’s brief is replete with references to income, exemptions, and taxable years, the only real issue is Betty Ann Ferguson’s refusal to “swear” or “affirm” before testifying at the hearing. Her objection to oaths and affirmations is rooted in two Biblical passages, Matthew 5:33-37 and James 5:12. \* \* \* |
|  |
| Ms. Ferguson, proceeding pro se, requested that Judge Korner consider the following statement set forth by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in *Staton v. Fought*, 486 So.2d 745 (La.1986), as an al­terna­tive to an oath or affirmation: |
|  |
| I, [Betty Ann Ferguson], do hereby declare that the facts I am about to give are, to the best of my knowledge and belief, accurate, correct, and complete. |
|  |
| Judge Korner abruptly denied her request, commenting that “[a]sking you to affirm that you will give true testimony does not violate any religious conviction that I have ever heard anybody had” and that he did not think affirming “violates any recognizable religious scruple.” Because Ms. Ferguson could only introduce the relevant evidence through her own testimony, Judge Korner then dismissed her petition for lack of prosecution. She now appeals to this court. |
| II.  **[1]** The right to free exercise of religion, guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution, is one of our most protected constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has stated that “only those inter­ests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). Accord *Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida*, 480 U.S. 136, 141, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1049, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987); and *Sherbert v. Verner*, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). The protection of the free exercise clause extends to all sincere relig­ious beliefs; courts may not evalu­ate religious truth. *United States v. Lee*, 455 U.S. 252, 257, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1055, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982); and *United States v. Ballard*, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87, 64 S.Ct. 882, 886-887, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944). Fed.R.Evid. 603, applicable in Tax Court under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7453, requires only that a witness “declare that [she] will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation adminis­tered in a form calcu­lated to awaken the witness’ conscience and impress the witness’ mind with the duty to do so.” As ev­idenced in the advisory committee notes accompanying Rule 603, Congress clearly intended to mini­mize any intrusion on the free exercise of religion: |
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| The rule is designed to afford the flexibility required in dealing with religious adults, atheists, con­sci­entious objectors, mental defectives, and children. Affirmation is simply a solemn undertaking to tell the truth; no special verbal formula is required. Accord Wright and Gold, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 6044 (West 1990). |
| The courts that have considered oath and affirmation issues have similarly attempted to accommo­date free exercise objections. In *Moore v. United States*, 348 U.S. 966, 75 S.Ct. 530, 99 L.Ed. 753 (1955) (per curiam), for example, the Supreme Court held that a trial judge erred in refusing the testi­mony of witnesses who would not use the word “solemnly” in their affirmations for religious reasons. |
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| \* \* \* \* |
| **[2]** The government offers only two justifications for Judge Korner’s refusal to consider the *Staton* statement. First, the government contends that the Tax Court was not bound by a Louisiana decision. This argument misses the point entirely; Ms. Ferguson offered *Staton* as an alternative to an oath or affirmation and not as a precedent. |
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| The government also claims that the *Staton* statement is insufficient because it does not acknowledge that the government may prosecute false statements for perjury. The federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, makes the taking of “an oath” an element of the crime of perjury. *Accord Smith v. United States*, 363 F.2d 143 (5th Cir.1966). However, Ms. Ferguson has expressed her willingness to add a sentence to the *Staton* statement acknowledging that she is subject to penalties for perjury. The gov­ernment has cited a number of cases invalidating perjury convictions where no oath was given, but none of the cases suggest that Ms. Ferguson’s proposal would not suffice as “an oath” for purposes of § 1621. See *Gordon*, 778 F.2d at 1401 n. 3 (statement by defendant that he understands he must accu­rately state the facts combined with acknowledgment that he is testifying under penalty of perjury would sat­isfy Fed.R.Civ.P. 43(d)). |
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| The parties’ briefs to this court suggest that the disagreement between Ms. Ferguson and Judge Korner might have been nothing more than an unfortunate misunderstanding. The relevant portion of their dialogue was as follows: |
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| MS. FERGUSON: I have religious objections to taking an oath. |
| THE COURT: All right. You may affirm. Then in lieu of taking an oath, you may affirm. |
| MS. FERGUSON: Sir, may I present this to you? I do not— |
| THE COURT: Just a minute. The Clerk will ask you. |
| THE CLERK: You are going to have to stand up and raise your right hand. |
| MS. FERGUSON: I do not affirm either. I have with me a certified copy of a case from the Louisiana Supreme Court. |
| THE COURT: I don’t care about a case from the Louisiana Supreme Court, Ms. Ferguson. You will either swear or you will affirm under penalties of perjury that the testimony you are about to give is true and correct, to the best of your knowledge. |
| MS. FERGUSON: In that case, Your Honor, please let the record show that I was willing to go un­der what has been acceptable by the State of Louisiana Supreme Court, the State versus— |
| THE COURT: We are not in the state of Louisiana, Ms. Ferguson. You are in a Federal court and you will do as I have instructed, or you will not testify. |
| MS. FERGUSON: Then let the record show that because of my religious objections, I will not be al­lowed to testify. |
|  |
| Ms. Ferguson contends that Judge Korner insisted that she use either the word “swear” or the word “affirm”; the government suggests instead that Judge Korner only required an affirmation which the government defines as “an alternative that encompasses all remaining forms of truth assertion that would satisfy [Rule 603].” Even Ms. Ferguson’s proposed alternative would be an “affirmation” under the government’s definition. |
|  |
| If Judge Korner had attempted to accommodate Ms. Ferguson by inquiring into her objections and considering her proposed alternative, the entire matter might have been resolved without an appeal to this court. Instead, however, Judge Korner erred not only in evaluating Ms. Ferguson’s religious be­lief, and concluding that it did not violate any “recognizable religious scruple,” but also in conditioning her right to testify and present evidence on what she perceived as a violation of that belief. His error is all the more apparent in light of the fact that Ms. Ferguson was proceeding pro se at the hearing. |
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| We therefore REVERSE the decision of the Tax Court and REMAND this case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. |
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| Additional Background— Corpus Juris Secundum  Because the body of American case law is huge, finding relevant precedents would be nearly im­practicable were it not for case digests, legal encyclopedias, and similar publications that classify deci­sions by subject. Like case digests, legal encyclope­dias present topics alphabetically, but encyclopedias provide more detail. The legal encyclopedia **Corpus Juris Secundum** (or C.J.S.) covers the entire field of law. It has been cited or directly quoted more than 50,000 times in federal and state appellate court opinions. The following is an excerpt from C.J.S.—Section 47 of the category “Theaters & Shows” (86 C.J.S. *Theaters & Shows* § 47). | | | |
| **f. Assumption of Risk**  **A patron assumes the ordinary and natural risks of the char**­**acter of the premises, devices, and form of amusement of which he has actual or im**­**puted knowledge; but he does not assume the risk of injury from the neg**­**ligence of the proprietor or third persons.**  While it has been said that, strictly speaking, the doctrine of as­sumed | | risk is applicable only to the relationship of master and servant,3 pa­trons of places of public amusement assume all natural and inherent risks pertaining to the character of the structure,4 or to the devices located therein,5 or to the form of amusement,6 which are open and visible. Patrons of places of public amusement assume such risks as are incident to their going without compul­sion to some part of the premises to which patrons are not invited and where they are not expected to be, and which risks | |
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| **3.** Cal.—Potts v. Crafts, 42 P.2d 87, 5 Cal.App.2d 83.  **4.** Mo.—King v. Ringling, 130 S.W. 482, 145 Mo.App. 285. 62 C.J. p 877 note 62.  **Darkened motion picture the**­**ater**  Ky.—Columbia Amusement Co. v. Rye, 155 S.W.2d 727, 288 Ky. 179.  N.J.—Falk v. Stanley Fabian Corporation of Delaware, 178 A. 740, 115 N.J.Law 141.  Tenn.—Smith v. Crescent Amusement Co., 184 S.W.2d 179, 27 Tenn.App. 632.  **5.** Cal.—Chardon v. Alameda Park Co., 36 P.2d 136, 1 Cal.App.2d 18.  Fla.—Payne v. City of Clearwater, 19 So.2d 406, 155 Fla. 9.  Mass.—Beaulieu v. Lincoln Rides, Inc., 104 N.E.2d 417, 328 Mass. 427.  Miss.—Blizzard v. Fitzsimmons, 10 So.2d 343, 193 Miss. 484.  Mo.—Toroian v. Parkview Amusement Co., 56 S.W.2d 134, 331 Mo. 700.  Ohio.—Pierce v. Gooding Amusement Co., App., 90 N.E.2d 585.  Tex.—Vance v. Obadal, Civ.App., 256 S.W.2d 139.  62 C.J. p 877 note 63  **Particular amusement devices**  (1) “Dodge Em” cars.—Connolly v. Palisades Realty & Amusement Co., 168 A. 419, 11 N.J.Misc. 841, affirmed 171 A. 795, 112 N.J.Law 502—Frazier v. Palisades Realty & Amusement Co., 168 A. 419, 11 N.J.Misc. 841, affirmed 171 A. 795, 112 N.J.Law 502—62 C.J. p 877 note 63 [b].  (2) Loop the loop.—Kemp v. Coney Island, Ohio App., 31 N.E.2d 93.  (3) Roller coaster.—Wray v. Fair-ield Amusement Co., 10 A.2d 600, 126 Conn. 221—62 C.J. p 877 note 63 [e].  **6.** Miss.—Blizzard v. Fitzsimmons, 10 So.2d 343, 193 Miss. 484.  Mo.—Page v. Unterreiner, App.,106 S.W.2d 528.  N.J.—Griffin v. De Geeter, 40 A.2d 579, 132 N.J.Law 381—Thurber v. Skouras Theatres Corporation, 170 A. 863, 112 N.J.Law 385.  N.Y.—Levy v. Cascades Operating Corpora-tion, 32 N.Y.S.2d 341, 263 App.Div. 882 —Saari v. State, 119 N.Y.S.2d 507, 203 Misc. 859—Schmidt v. State, 100 N.Y.S.2d 504, 198 Misc. 802. | Vt.—Dusckiewicz v. Carter, 52 A.2d 788, 115 Vt. 122.  62 C.J. p 877 note 63.  **Other statements of rule**  (1) A spectator at game as­sumes risk of such dangers inci­dent to playing of game as are known to him or should be obvi­ous to reasonable and pru­dent person in exercise of due care un­der cir­cum­stances.  Minn.—Modec v. City of Eveleth, 29 N.W.2d 453, 224 Minn. 556.  Neb.—Klause v. Nebraska State Board of Agriculture, 35 N.W.2d 104, 150 Neb. 466—Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation, 12 N.W.2d 90, 144 Neb. 22.  (2) One participating in a race assumes the risk of injury from natural hazards necessarily in­ci­dent to, or which inhere in, such a race, under maxim “volenti non fit injuria,” which means that to which a person assents is not es­teemed in law an injury.—Hotels El Rancho v. Pray, 187 P.2d 568, 64 Nev. 591.  (3) Patrons of a place of amusement assume the risk of ordinary dangers normally atten­dant thereon and also the risks ensuing from condi­tions of which they now or of which, in the par­tic­ular circumstances, they are charged with knowl­edge, and which inhere therein.—Young v. Ross, 21 A.2d 762, 127 N.J.Law 211.  **Liability of proprietor of sports arena**  Generally, the proprietor of an establishment where contests of baseball, hockey, etc., are con­ducted, is not liable for injuries to its patrons.—Zeitz v. Cooperstown Baseball Cen-tennial, 29 N.Y.S.2d 56.  Risks of particular sports or en­tertain­ment  (1) Baseball.  Cal.—Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass’n, 46 P.2d 141, 3 Cal.2d 725—Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19, 99 Cal.App.2d 484—Ratcliff v. San Diego Baseball Club of Pacific Coast League, 81 P.2d 625, 27 Cal.App.2d 733.  Ind.—Emhardt v. Perry Stadium, 46 N.E.2d 704, 113 Ind.App. 197.  La.—Jones v. Alexandria Baseball Ass’n, App., 50 So.2d 93.  Mo.—Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 164 S.W.2d 318, 349 Mo. 1215—Grimes v. American League Baseball Co., App., 78 S.W.2d | | N.Y.—Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, 281 N.Y.S. 505, 245 App.Div.137—Jones v. Kane & Roach, 43 N.Y.S.2d 140, 187 Misc. 37—Blackball v. Albany Baseball & Amusement Co., 285 N.Y.S.2d 695, 157 Misc. 801—Zeitz v. Cooperstown Baseball Centennial, 29 N.Y.S.2d 56.  N.C.—Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co., 1 S.E.2d 131, 215 N.C. 64.  Ohio.—Hummel v. Columbus Baseball Club, 49 N.E.2d 773, 71 Ohio App. 321—Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club Co., 24 N.e.2d 837, 62 Ohio App. 514.  Okl.—Hull v. Oklahoma City Baseball Co., 163 P.2d 982, 196 Okl. 40.  Tex.—Williams v. Houston Baseball Ass’n, Civ.App., 154 S.W.2d 874—Keys v. Alamo City Baseball Co., Civ.App., 150 S.W.2d 368.  Utah.—Hamilton v. Salt Lake City Corp., 237 P.2d 841.  62 C.J. p 877 note 63 [a].  (2) Basketball.—Paine v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 13 A.2d 820, 91 N.H. 78.  (3) Golf. Mass.—Katz v. Gow, 75 N.E.2d 438, 321 Mass. 666.  N.J.—Young v. Ross, 21 A.2d 762, 127 N.J.Law 211.  (4) Diving.—Hill v. Merrick, 31 P.2d 663, 147 Or. 244.  (5) Hockey.  Minn.—Modec v. City of Eveleth, 29 N.W.2d 453, 224 Minn. 556.  N.Y.—Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, 281 N.Y.S.2d 505, 245 App.Div. 137—Hammel v. Madison Square Garden Corporation, 279 N.Y.S. 815, 156 Misc. 311.  (6) Horse racing.  Nev.—Hotels El Rancho v. Pray, 187 P.2d 568, 64 Nev. 591.  N.Y.—Futterer v. Saratoga Ass’n for Improvement of Breed of Horses, 31 N.Y.S.2d 108, 262 App.Div. 675.  (7) Ice skating.  Neb.—McCullough v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation, 12 N.W.2d 639, 144 Neb. 92.  N.D.—Filler v. Stenvick, 56 N.W.2d 798.  Pa.—Oberheim v. Pennsylvania Sports & Enterprises, 55 A.2d 766, 358 Pa. 62.  (8) Square dancing.—Gough v. Wadhams Mills Grange No. 1015, P. of H., 109 N.Y.S.2d 374. |
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| Additional Background— |
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| United States Code |
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| Until 1926, federal statutes were published in one volume of the Revised Statutes of 1875 and in each subsequent volume of the Statutes at Large. In 1926, these laws were rearranged into fifty sub­ject ar­eas and republished as the **United States Code**. In the United States Code, all federal laws of a public and permanent nature are compiled according to subject. Subjects are assigned titles and title numbers. Within each title, subjects are further subdivided, and each statute is given a section number. The fol­lowing is the text of Section 1 of Title 15 of the United States Code (15 U.S.C. § 1). |
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| TITLE 15. COMMERCE AND TRADE |
| CHAPTER 1—MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE |
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| § 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty |
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| Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com­merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one mil­lion dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by im­prisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. |
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| (July 2, 1890, c. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209; Aug. 17, 1937, c. 690, Title VIII, 50 Stat. 693; July 7, 1955, c. 281, 69 Stat. 282.) |
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| (As amended Dec. 21, 1974, Pub.L. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708; Dec. 12, 1975, Pub.L. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801.) |
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| **Additional Background—** |
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| **State Codes:** |
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| Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes |
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| State codes may have any of several names—Codes, General Statutes, Revisions, and so on—de­pending on the preference of the states. Also arranged by subject, some codes indicate subjects by numbers. Others assign names. The following is the text of one of the state statutes whose citations are explained in the textbook—Section 1101 of Title 13 of the **Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes** (13 Pa. C.S. § 1101). |
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| PURDON’S PENNSYLVANIA CONSOLIDATED STATUTES ANNOTATED |
| DIVISION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS |
| CHAPTER 11. SHORT TITLE, CONSTRUCTION, APPLICATION AND SUBJECT MATTER OF TITLE |
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| § 1101. Short title of title |
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| This title shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Commercial Code.” |
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| 1984 Main Volume Credit(s) |
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| 1979, Nov. 1, P.L. 255, No. 86, § 1, effective Jan. 1, 1980. |
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| **California Commercial Code** |
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| The text of another of the state statutes whose citations are explained in the textbook follows—Section 1101 of the **California Commercial Code** (Cal. Com. Code § 1101). |
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| WEST’S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES |
| COMMERCIAL CODE |
| DIVISION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS |
| CHAPTER 1. SHORT TITLE, CONSTRUCTION, APPLICATION AND SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CODE |
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| § 1101. Short Title |
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| This code shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code. |
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| 1964 Main Volume Credit(s) |
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| (Stats.1963, c. 819, § 1101.) |
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| Additional Background— |
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| Code of Federal Regulations |
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| Created by Congress in 1937, the **Code of Federal Regulations** is a set of softcover volumes that con­tain the regulations of federal agencies currently in effect. Items are selected from those pub­lished in the Federal Register and arranged in a scheme of fifty titles, some of which are the same as those or­ganizing the statutes in the United States Code (discussed above). Each title is divided into chapters, parts, and sections. The Code of Federal Regulations is completely revised every year. The following is the text of Section 230.504 of Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations (17 C.F.R. § 230.504). |
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| TITLE 17—COMMODITY AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE |
| Chapter II—Securities and Exchange Commission |
| **Part 230—General Rules and Regulations, Securities Act of 1933** |
| **REGULATION B—EXEMPTION RELATING TO FRACTIONAL UNDIVIDED INTERESTS IN OIL OR GAS RIGHTS** |
| **Regulation D—Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933** |
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| **§ 230.504 Exemption for Limited Offerings and Sales of Securities Not Exceeding $1,000,000.** |
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| **(a) Exemption.** |
|  |
| Offers and sales of securities that satisfy the conditions in paragraph (b) of this Section by an issuer that is not subject to the reporting requirements of section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act and that is not an investment company shall be exempt from the provisions of section 5 of the Act under section 3(b) of the Act. |
|  |
| **(b) Conditions to be met—** |
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| **(b)(1) General Conditions.** To qualify for exemption under this § 230.504, offers and sales must satisfy the terms and conditions of §§ 230.501 and 230.502, except that the provisions of § 230.502(c) and (d) shall not apply to offers and sales of securities under this § 230.504 that are made: |
|  |
| (b)(1)(i) Exclusively in one or more states each of which provides for the registration of the securities and requires the delivery of a disclosure document before sale and that are made in accordance with those state provisions; or |
|  |
| (b)(1)(ii) In one or more states which have no provision for the registration of the securities and the de­livery of a disclosure document before sale, if the securities have been registered in at least one state which provides for such registration and delivery before sale, offers and sales are made in the state of registration in accordance with such state provisions, and such document is in fact delivered to all pur­chasers in the states which have no such procedure before the sale of the securities. |
|  |
| **(b)(2) Specific condition—** |
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| (b)(2)(i) Limitation on aggregate offering price. The aggregate offering price for an offering of securi­ties under this § 230.504, as defined in § 230.501(c), shall not exceed $1,000,000, less the aggregate offer­ing price for all securities sold within the twelve months before the start of and during the offering of se­curities under this § 230.504 in reliance on any exemption under section 3(b) of the Act or in violation of section 5(a) of the Act, provided that no more than $500,000 of such aggregate offering price is at­tributable to offers and sales of securities without registration under a state’s securities laws. |
|  |
| Note 1.—The calculation of the aggregate offering price is illustrated as follows: |
|  |
| Example 1. If an issuer sells $500,000 worth of its securities pursuant to state registration on January 1, 1988 under this § 230.504, it would be able to sell an additional $500,000 worth of securities either pursuant to state registration or without state registration during the ensuing twelve-month period, pursuant to this § 230.504. |
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| Example 2. If an issuer sold $900,000 pursuant to state registration on June 1, 1987 under this § 230.504 and an additional $4,100,000 on December 1, 1987 under § 230.505, the issuer could not sell any of its se­curities under this § 230.504 until December 1, 1988. Until then the issuer must count the December 1, 1987 sale towards the $1,000,000 limit within the preceding twelve months. |
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| Note 2.—If a transaction under this § 230.504 fails to meet the limitation on the aggregate offering price, it does not affect the availability of this § 230.504 for the other transactions considered in apply­ing such limitation. For example, if an issuer sold $1,000,000 worth of its securities pursuant to state reg­istration on January 1, 1988 under this § 230.504 and an additional $500,000 worth on July 1, 1988, this § 230.504 would not be available for the later sale, but would still be applicable to the January 1, 1988 sale. |
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| Note 3.—In addition to the aggregation principles, issuers should be aware of the applicability of the in­tegration principles set forth in § 230.502(a). |
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| (b)(2)(ii) Advice about the limitations on resale. Except where the provision does not apply by virtue of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer, at a reasonable time prior to the sale of securities, shall ad­vise each purchaser of the limitations on resale in the manner contained in paragraph (d)(2) of § 230.502. |
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| [53 FR 7869, March 10, 1988; 54 FR 11372, March 20, 1989] |
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| AUTHORITY: Secs. 6, 7, 8, 10, 19(a), 48 Stat. 78, 79, 81, 85; secs. 205, 209, 48 Stat. 906, 908; sec. 301, 54 Stat. 857; sec. 8, 68 Stat. 685; Sec. 308(a)(2), 90 Stat. 57; Secs. 3(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d), 23(a), 48 Stat. 882, 892, 894, 895, 901; secs. 203(a), 1, 3, 8, 49 Stat. 704, 1375, 1377, 1379; sec. 202, 68 Stat. 686; secs. 4, 5, 6(d), 78 Stat. 569, 570-574; secs. 1, 2, 3, 82 Stat. 454, 455; secs. 28(c), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 84 Stat. 1435, 1497; sec. 105(b), 88 Stat. 1503; secs. 8, 9, 10, 89 Stat. 117, 118, 119; sec. 308(b), 90 Stat. 57; sec. 18, 89 Stat. 155; secs. 202, 203, 204, 91 Stat. 1494, 1498-1500; sec. 20(a), 49 Stat. 833; sec. 319, 53 Stat. 1173; sec. 38, 54 Stat. 841; 15 U.S.C. 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77s(a), 78c(b), 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(d), 78w(a), 79t(a), 77sss(a), 80a-37. |
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| Source: Sections 230.490 to 230.494 contained in Regulation C, 12 FR 4076, June 24, 1947, unless oth­er­wise noted. |
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| Note.—In §§ 230.400 to 230.499, the numbers to the right of the decimal point correspond with the re­spective rule number in Regulation C, under the Securities Act of 1933. |

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| Additional Background— |
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| United States Code Annotated |
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| Published by West Publishing Company, the **United States Code Annotated** contains the complete text of laws enacted by Congress that are included in the United States Code (discussed above), together with case notes (known as annotations) of judicial decisions that interpret and apply specific sections of the statutes. Also included are the text of presidential proclamations and executive orders, specially prepared research aids, historical notes, and library references. The following are ex­cerpts from the materials found at Section 1 of Title 15 of the United States Code Annotated (15 U.S.C.A. § 1), including the historical notes and selected references. |
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| **TITLE 15. COMMERCE AND TRADE** |
| **CHAPTER 1—MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE** |
|  |
| **§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty** |
|  |
| Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com­merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one mil­lion dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by im­prisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. |
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| (July 2, 1890, c. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209; Aug. 17, 1937, c. 690, Title VIII, 50 Stat. 693; July 7, 1955, c. 281, 69 Stat. 282.) |
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| (As amended Dec. 21, 1974, Pub.L. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708; Dec. 12, 1975, Pub.L. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801.) |
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| **HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES** |
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| Effective Date of 1975 Amendment. Section 4 of Pub.L. 94-145 provided that: “The amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of this Act [to this section and section 45(a) of this title] shall take effect upon the ex­piration of the ninety-day period which begins on the date of enactment of this Act [Dec. 12, 1975].” |
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| Short Title of 1984 Amendment. Pub.L. 98-544, § 1, Oct. 24, 1984, 98 Stat. 2750, provided: “That this Act [enacting sections 34 to 36 of this title and provisions set out as a note under section 34 of this title] may be cited as the ‘Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984’.” |
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| Short Title of 1982 Amendment. Pub.L. 97-290, Title IV, § 401, Oct. 8, 1982, 96 Stat. 1246, provided that “This title [enacting section 6a of this title and section 45(a) (3) of this title] may be cited as the ‘Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982’.” |
|  |
| Short Title of 1980 Amendment. Pub.L. 96-493, § 1, Dec. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 2568, provided: “That this Act [enacting section 26a of this title] may be cited as the ‘Gasohol Competition Act of 1980’.” |
|  |
| Short Title of 1975 Amendment. Section 1 of Pub.L. 94-145 provided: “That this Act [which amended this section and section 45(a) of this title and enacted provisions set out as a note under this section] may be cited as the ‘Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975’.” |
|  |
| Short Title of 1974 Amendment. Section 1 of Pub.L. 93-528 provided: “That this Act [amending this section, and sections 2, 3, 16, 28, and 29 of this title, and section 401 of Title 47, Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs, and enacting provisions set out as notes under sections 1 and 29 of this title] may be cited as the ‘Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act’.” |
|  |
| Short Title. Pub.L. 94-435, Title III, § 305(a), Sept. 30, 1976, 90 Stat. 1397, inserted immediately af­ter the enacting clause of Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, the following: “That this Act [sections 1 to 7 of this title] may be cited as the ‘Sherman Act’.” |
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| Legislative History. For legislative history and purpose of Act July 7, 1955, see 1955 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 2322. |
|  |
| For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 93-528, see 1974 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 6535. See, also, Pub.L. 94-145, 1975 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1569. |
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| **REFERENCES** |
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| **CROSS REFERENCES** |
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| Antitrust laws inapplicable to labor organizations, see § 17 of this title. |
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| Carriers relieved from operation of antitrust laws, see § 5(11) of Title 49, Transportation. |
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| Combinations in restraint of import trade, see § 8 of this title. |
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| Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States, see § 371 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure. |
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| Discrimination in price, services or facilities, see § 13 of this title. |
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| Fishing industry, restraints of trade in, see § 522 of this title. |
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| Misdemeanor defined, see § 1 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure. |
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| Monopolies prohibited, see § 2 of this title. |
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| Trusts in territories or District of Columbia prohibited, see § 3 of this title. |
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| **FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE** |
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| 1990 Pocket Part Federal Practice and Procedure |
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| Adding new parties, see Wright & Miller: Civil § 1504. |
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| Adequacy of representation of members in class actions instituted under sections 1 to 7 of this title, see Wright, Miller & Kane: Civil 2d § 1765. |
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| Answers to interrogatories with respect to justification for unlawful activity, see Wright & Miller: Civil § 2167. |
|  |
| Applicability of rule relating to summary judgment, see Wright, Miller & Kane: Civil 2d § 2730. |
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| Applicability of standards developed by federal courts under sections 1 to 7 of this title to certain in­trastate transactions, see Wright, Miller, Cooper & Gressman: Jurisdiction § 4031. |
|  |
| Authority of district court to award injunctive relief in actions to restrain antitrust violations, see Wright & Miller: Civil § 2942. |
|  |
| Capacity of unincorporated association to sue and be sued, see Wright & Miller: Civil § 1564. |
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| Discretion of court in taxing costs, see Wright, Miller & Kane: Civil 2d § 2668. |
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| Elements of offense to be alleged directly and with certainty, see Wright: Criminal 2d § 126. |
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| Joinder of claims, see Wright & Miller: Civil § 1587. |
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| **CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS** |
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| 1973 Main Volume Code of Federal Regulations |
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| Advisory opinions and rulings of particular trade practices, see 16 CFR 15.1 et seq. |
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| Common sales agency, see 16 CFR 15.46. |
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| Compliance with state milk marketing orders, see 16 CFR 15.154. |
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| Guides and trade practice rules for particular industries, see 16 CFR subd. B, parts 17 to 254. |
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| **LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES** |
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| Abolishing the act of state doctrine. Michael J. Bazyler, 134 U.Pa.L.Rev. 325 (1986). |
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| Affecting commerce test: The aftermath of McLain. Richard A. Mann, 24 |
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| **ANNOTATIONS** |
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| 1. Common law |
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| Congress did not intend text of sections 1 to 7 of this title to delineate their full meaning or their appli­cation in concrete situations, but, rather, Congress expected courts to give shape to their broad man­date by drawing on common-law tradition. National Society of Professional Engineers v. U.S., U.S.Dist.Col.1978, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 435 U.S. 679, 55 L.Ed.2d 637. |
|  |
| This section has a broader application to price fixing agreements than the common law prohibitions or sanctions. U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Wis.1940, 60 S.Ct. 811, 310 U.S. 150, 84 L.Ed. 1129, re­hear­ing denied 60 S.Ct. 1091, 310 U.S. 658, 84 L.Ed. 1421. |
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| Effect of §§ 1 to 7 of this title was to make contracts in restraint of trade, void at common law, unlawful in positive sense and created civil action for damages in favor of injured party. Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., C.A.Tex.1962, 308 F.2d 403. |
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| Combinations in restraint of trade or tending to create or maintain monopoly gave rise to actions at common law. Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., C.A.Ga.1957, 244 F.2d 471. |
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| Federal statutory law on monopolies did not supplant common law but incorporated it. Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., D.C.Okl.1971, 352 F.Supp. 1095. |
|  |
| Common-law principle that manufacturer can deal with one retailer in a community or area and refuse to sell to any other has not been modified by §§ 1 to 7 of this title or any other act of Congress. U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., D.C.Ill.1965, 237 F.Supp. 323, reversed on other grounds 87 S.Ct. 1856, 388 U.S. 365, 18 L.Ed.2d 1249, on remand 291 F.Supp. 564, 567. |
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| This section is but an exposition of common law doctrines in restraint of trade and is to be interpreted in the light of common law. U.S. v. Greater Kansas City Chapter Nat. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, D.C.Mo.1949, 82 F.Supp. 147. |
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| **Case Synopsis—** |
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| **A Sample Case: *Apple Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc.*** |
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| Apple products (iPads, iPhones, iPods) use the term APP STORE. Amazon.com launched an Appstore for viewing and downloading applications to Android devices (such as the Kindle Fire). Apple claimed that Amazon’s use of the word “Appstore” constituted false advertising and trademark infringement—that Amazon’s use of “Appstore” misled the public into thinking that Amazon’s Appstore is affiliated with Apple and offers the same content. |
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| A federal district court determined that consumers were not deceived by the two vendors’ use of the same term. There was no evidence that consumers understood “app store” to include specific qualities, characteristics, or attributes or were otherwise misled by the use of the term. |
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| **Notes and Questions** |
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| ***What is required to establish that an ad, or the use of a certain term, as in this case, constitutes false advertising?*** A false advertising claim requires either a false statement of fact in an ad or evidence showing exactly what message was conveyed that was sufficient to constitute false advertising. In this case, the court was asked to consider, in light of a false advertising claim, whether Amazon could use the term “Appstore” to designate a site for buying apps. Apple made this assertion without representing that the nature, characteristics, or quality of the site is the same as that of Apple’s “APP STORE.” This did not meet the standard for establishing false advertising. |
|  |
| ***Amazon filed a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. What is a material fact? What indicates that a dispute over a material fact is genuine?*** Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the party against whom the motion is filed. |
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| **Teaching Suggestions** |
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| **1.** Emphasize that the law is not simple—there are no simple solutions to complex problems. Legal prin­ciples are presented in this course as “black letter law”—that is, in the form of basic principles generally ac­cepted by the courts or expressed in statutes. In fact, the law is not so concrete and static. One of the pur­poses of this course is to acquaint students with legal problems and issues that occur in society in general and in business in particular. The limits of time and space do not allow all of the principles to be presented against the background of their development and the reasoning in their application. By the end of the course, students should be able to recognize legal problems (“spot the issues”) when they arise. In the real world, this may be enough to seek professional legal assistance. In this course, students should also be able to recognize the com­peting interests involved in an issue and reason through opposing points of view to a decision. |
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| **2.** Point out that the law assumes everyone knows it, or, as it’s often phrased, “Ignorance of the law is no excuse.” Of course, the volume and expanding proliferation of statutes, rules, and court decisions is beyond the ability of anyone to know it all. But pointing out the law’s presumption might encourage students to study. Also, knowing the law allows business people to make better business decisions. |
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| **3.** As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, “The life of the law has not been logic”—that is, the law does not re­spond to an internal logic. It responds to social change. Emphasize that laws (and legal systems) are man­made, that they can, and do, change over time as society changes. ***To what specific so***­***cial forces does law re***­***spond? Are the changes always improvements?***  (These questions can also be discussed in connection with Chapter 5.) |
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| **4.** One method of introducing the subject matter of each class is to give students a hypothetical at the be­ginning of the class. The hypothetical should illustrate the competing interests involved in some part of the law in the assigned reading. Students should be asked to make a decision about the case and to explain the reasons behind their decision. Once the law has been discussed, the same hypothetical can be considered from an ethical perspective. |
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| **5.** You might want to remind your students that the facts in a case should be accepted as given. For example, under some circumstances, an oral contract may be enforceable. If there is a statement in a case about the existence of oral contract, it should be accepted that there was an oral contract. Arguing with the statement (“How could you prove that there was an *oral* contract?” for instance) will only undercut their learning. Once they have learned the principle for which a case is presented, then they can ask, “What if the facts were different?” |
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| *Cyberlaw Link* |
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| Ask your students, at this early stage in their study of business law, what they feel are the chief legal issues in developing a Web site or doing business online. ***What are the legal risks involved in transacting business over the Internet?*** As their knowledge of the law increases over the next few weeks, this question can be reconsidered. |
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**Discussion Questions**

**1. *If justice is defined as the fair, impartial consideration of opposing interests, are law and justice the same thing?*** No. There can be law without justice—as happened in Nazi-occupied Europe, for ex­ample. There cannot be justice without law.

**2. *Which of the schools of legal thought matches the U.S. system?***  None of the approaches mentioned in these sections is an exact model of the American legal system. They rep­re­sent frameworks that can be used in evaluating the moral and ethical considerations that are an integral part of the law.

**3. *What is the common law?***  Students may most usefully understand common law to be case law—that is, the body of law derived from judicial decisions. The body of common law originated in England. The term common law is sometimes used to refer to the entire common law system to distinguish it from the civil law sys­tem.

**4. *What is the supreme law of the land?*** The federal constitution is the supreme law of the land. ***What are statutes?***  Laws enacted by Congress or a state legislative body. ***What are ordinances?***  Laws enacted by local legislative bodies. ***What are administrative rules?***  Laws issued by administrative agen­cies under the authority given to them in statutes.

**5. *What is the Uniform Commercial Code?***  A uniform law drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, governing commercial transactions (sales of goods, commercial paper, bank deposits and collections, letters of credit, bulk transfers, warehouse re­ceipts, bills of lading, investment securities, and secured transactions). Uniform laws are often adopted in whole or in substantial part by the states. The UCC has been adopted by all states (except Louisiana which has not adopted Article 2).

**6. *Discuss the differences within the classification of law as civil law and criminal law.***  Civil law con­cerns rights and duties of individuals between themselves; crimi­nal law concerns offenses against soci­ety as a whole. (Civil law is a term that is also used to refer to a legal system based on a code rather than on case law.)

**7. *Discuss the differences between remedies at law and in equity.***  Remedies at law were once lim­ited to payments of money or property (including land) as damages. Remedies in equity were available only when there was no adequate remedy at law. Today, in most states, either or both may be granted in the same action. Remedies in equity are still discretionary, guided by equitable principles and maxims. Remedies at law still include payments of money or property as damages. Today, the major practical difference between actions at law and actions in equity is the right to demand a jury trial in an action at law.

**8. *Identify and describe remedies available in equity.***  Three are discussed briefly in the text Specific per­formance is available only when a dispute involves a contract. The court may order a party to per­form what was promised. An injunction orders a person to do or refrain from doing a particular act. Rescission undoes an agreement, and the parties are returned to the positions they were in before the agreement.

**9. *What is the primary function of law?*** The primary function of law is to simultaneously maintain stability and permit change. The law does this by providing for dispute resolution, the preservation of political, economic, and social institu­tions, and the protection of property.

**10. *What is* stare decisis*? Why is it important?*** *Stare decisis* is a doctrine that prescribes following earlier judicial decisions in deciding a current case if the facts and questions are similar. Courts attempt to be consistent with their own prior decisions and with the decisions of courts superior to them. *Stare decisis* is im­portant because part of the function of law is to maintain stability. If the application of the law was unpre­dictable, there would be no consistent rules to follow and no stability.

**Activity and Research Assignments**

**1.** Have students research the laws of other common law jurisdictions (England, India, Canada), other le­gal systems (civil law systems, contemporary China, Moslem nations), and ancient civilizations (the Hebrews, the Babylonians, the Romans), and compare the laws to those of the United States. In looking at other legal systems, have students consider how international law might develop, given the differences in le­gal systems, laws, traditions, and customs.

**2.** Assign specific cases and statutes for students to find. If legal materials are not easily available, as­sign a list of citations for students to decipher.

**3.** Ask students to read newspapers and magazines, listen to radio news, watch television news, and surf the World Wide Web for developments in the law—new laws passed by Congress or signed by the president, laws interpreted by the courts, proposals for changes in the law. The omnipresent effect of law on society should be easy to see.

**Explanations of Selected Footnotes in the Text**

**Footnote 5:** In ***Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka***, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the sepa­rate but equal concept had no place in education. The case involved four con­solidated cases focusing on the per­missibility of local governments conducting school systems that segre­gated students by race. In each case blacks sought admission to public schools on a nonsegregated basis, and in each case the lower court based its decision on the separate but equal doctrine. The Court inter­preted the principles of the U.S> Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment as they should apply to modern soci­ety and looked at the effects of segregation. The justices found that segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives the children of the mi­nority group of equal educational opportunities. To separate black children “from others of similar age and qualifica­tions solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”

**Footnote 6:** In ***Plessy v. Ferguson***, the United States Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of sepa­rate but equal. A Louisiana state statute required that all railway companies provide separate but equal accommodations for black and white passengers, imposing criminal sanctions for violations. Plessy, who al­leged his ancestry was seven-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African, attempted to use the coach for whites. The Court said that the U.S. Constitution’s Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments (the Civil War Amendments) “could not have been in­tended to abolish distinctions based on color, or to enforce social .  .  . equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.” According to the Court, laws requiring racial separation did not necessar­ily imply the inferiority of either race. In a lone dissent, Justice Harlan expressed the opinion that the Civil War Amendments had removed “the race line from our governmental systems,” and the Constitution was thus “color-blind.”

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| Reviewing— |
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|  Law and Legal Reasoning  |
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| Suppose that the California legislature passes a law that severely restricts carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles in that state. A group of automobile manufacturers file suit against the state of California to prevent the enforcement of the law. The automakers claim that a federal law already sets fuel economy standards nationwide, and that fuel economy standards are essentially the same as carbon dioxide emission standards. According to the automobile manufacturers, it is unfair to allow California to pass more stringent regulations than those set by the federal law. Ask your students to answer the following questions, using the information presented in the chapter. |
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| **1. *Who are the parties (the plaintiffs and the defendant) in this lawsuit?*** The automobile manufacturers are the plaintiffs, and the state of California is the defendant. |
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| **2. *Are the plaintiffs seeking a legal remedy or an equitable remedy? Why?*** The plaintiffs are seeking an injunction, an equitable remedy, to prevent the state of California from enforcing its statute restricting carbon dioxide emissions. |
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| **3. *What is the primary source of the law that is at issue here?*** This case involves a law passed by the California legislature and a federal statute; thus the primary source of law is statutory law. |
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| **4. *Where would you look to find the relevant California and federal laws?*** Federal statutes are found in the *United States Code,* and California statutes are published in the *California Code*. You would look in these sources to find the relevant state and federal statutes. |
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|  Debate This:  |
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| ***Under the doctrine of* stare decisis*, courts are obligated to follow the precedents established in their jurisdictions unless there is a compelling reason not to. Should U.S. courts continue to adhere to this common law principle, given that our government now regulates so many areas by statute?*** Both England and the U.S. legal systems were constructed on the common law system. The doctrine of *stare decisis* has always been a major part of this system—courts should follow precedents when they are clearly established, excepted under compelling reasons. Even though more common law is being turned into statutory law, the doctrine of *stare decisis* is still valid. After all, even statutes have to be interpreted by courts. What better basis for judges to render their decisions than by basing them on precedents related to the subject at hand? |
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| In contrast, some students may argue that the doctrine of *stare decisis* is passé. There is certainly less common law governing, say, environmental law than there was 100 years ago. Given that federal and state governments increasingly are regulating more aspects of commercial transactions between merchants and consumers, perhaps the courts should simply stick to statutory language when disputes arise. |
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| ExamPrep— |
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|  Issue Spotters  |
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| **1. *Under what circumstances might a judge rely on case law to determine the intent and purpose of a statute?*** Case law includes courts’ interpre­tations of stat­utes, as well as constitu­tional provisions and admin­istrative rules. Statutes often codify common law rules. For these reasons, a judge might rely on the common law as a guide to the intent and purpose of a statute. |
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| **2. *After World War II, several Nazis were convicted of “crimes against humanity” by an international court. Assuming that these convicted war criminals had not disobeyed any law of their country and had merely been following their government’s orders, what law had they violated? Explain.*** At the time of the Nuremberg trials, “crimes against humanity” were new international crimes. The laws criminalized such acts as murder, extermination, enslavement, depor­tation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population. These in­ternational laws derived their legitimacy from “natural law.” Natural law, which is the oldest and one of the most significant schools of jurisprudence, holds that governments and legal systems should reflect the moral and ethical ideals that are inherent in hu­man nature. Because natural law is universal and discoverable by reason, its adherents believe that all other law is derived from natural law. Natural law therefore supersedes laws created by humans (national, or “positive,” law), and in a conflict between the two, national or positive law loses its legitimacy. The Nuremberg defendants asserted that they had been acting in accordance with German law. The judges dismissed these claims, reasoning that the defendants’ acts were commonly regarded as crimes and that the accused must have known that the acts would be considered criminal. The judges clearly believed the tenets of natural law and expected that the defendants, too, should have been able to realize that their acts ran afoul of it. The fact that the “positivist law” of Germany at the time required them to commit these acts is irrelevant. Under natural law theory, the international court was justified in finding the defendants guilty of crimes against humanity. |
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